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Abstract
This study examines the dynamics of the Anglophone separatist claims in Cameroon,
the so called “Anglophone Crisis”. I focus on explaining why the separatist claims reemerged
in 2016 after being shut down for about 20 years. It explains how the Anglophone separatist
revendications have sustained over time despite the extremely centralized power of the Paul
Biya government. This paper first argues that the Anglophone crisis is more than an identity
struggle between Anglophone/Francophone Cameroonians, but rather a conflict about
historical and institutional grievances, political competition, and regional politics involving
the neighboring state of Nigeria.
Second, it verifies the hypothesis that the sustainability of the Anglophone separatist
claims relies on the important support of Cameroonians from the diaspora with the
contribution of social media. According to this hypothesis, over the years, this diaspora has
contributed to strengthen the Anglophone identity and to maintain a mobilization of
Anglophone Cameroonians on the ground around the idea of an independent republic, the
republic of Ambazonia. This mobilization has been mainly led through the internet space,
especially on social media.
Finally, I explain the dynamics of the online mobilization of the separatist
Anglophone movements. I argue that this mobilization is achieved through the spreading of
hate speech and disinformation on social media platform such as Facebook. I also argue that
despite this important virtual mobilization, the Anglophone separatist movements reemerged
as unstructured entities, composed of multiple armed groups that don’t necessarily cooperate.
Indeed, despite the apparent consensual mobilization around an independent republic of
Ambazonia, it is still hard to perceive any homogeneity in the political and military structure
of this separatist movement. This fragmentation among the Anglophone people make the
political negotiation with the Cameroonian government more difficult to achieve. In addition,
I analyze the perception of this mobilization by international media, by doing a content
analysis of the coverage BBC and Jeune Afrique.
Existing literature on secession in Africa analyzes secession as identity, religious or
ethnic struggles. My study aims to analyze the Anglophone crisis with a different approach
which considers the role of the diaspora and the mobilization on internet. It also captures the
regional dynamic of the conflict involving the key role of Nigeria.
My research suggests that secession must be examined differently than the way it has
been studied by previous scholars. Indeed, previous studies focused on the local and national
dynamic of this phenomena, limiting it to the borders of states. My study challenges this
approach by showing secession as a struggle that transcends borders, by considering the
diasporas and the internet as important actors in the struggle. I suggest embedding separatist
movements in the globalized and digitized world in which we live today.
In the final chapter, my study also explores potential measures that have to be taken to
handle the crisis. First, it suggests a strengthening of the decentralization guaranteed by the
Cameroonian constitution. Second, it encourages the humanitarian cooperation between
Cameroon and Nigeria to keep the stability of their common border. Finally, it explains that
the Anglophone crisis should also raise the awareness of the international community about
the issue of disinformation and propaganda on the internet during conflict, which is one of
our modern day’s challenge.

4

Key words definitions

Anglophone Crisis: It is a conflict which opposes Anglophone separatists from the
Northwest and Southwest (Anglophone regions) of Cameroon to the Cameroonian
government led by Paul Biya. The conflict started in 2016 with a teachers and lawyers protest
before becoming a civil war involving killings both from the government and the separatist
side. This conflict is an extension of the “Anglophone problem” which started in 1990s with
peaceful protests.

Ambazonia: Ambazonia is a term derived from the word Ambas Bay, a bay considered to
be the natural boundary of the former Republique du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons.
The name was coined in 1984 by a group led by FonGorji Dinka, who unilaterally declared
the ‘Republic of Ambazonia’ an independent state that would have comprised all Anglophone
Cameroon regions, Northwest and Southwest Cameroon. The term was taken up again after
the 2016 events by pro-independence actors wishing to reassert their identity and separate the
Anglophone regions from the rest of Francophone Cameroon.
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“Tolerance is a virtue that makes peace possible”
Kofi Annan

This thesis is dedicated to all the Cameroonians, civilians, soldiers who died since the
Anglophone crisis started, as well as the one who are still affected by the conflict.
We are all Cameroonians, no matter our linguistic, ethnic or religious belonging. We must
cherish the peace and stability of our beloved country.
United we stand, divided we fall.

****
Ce mémoire est dédié à tous les camerounais, civils, soldats qui sont morts depuis le début de
la crise anglophone, aussi bien qu’à ceux qui sont toujours affectés par le conflit
Nous sommes tous camerounais, peu importe notre appartenance linguistique, ethnique ou
religieuse. Nous devons chérir la paix et la stabilité de notre pays bien-aimé.
Unis, nous gagnons, divisés nous tombons.
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Introduction
The national unity and the stability of African states are often questioned by
international observers. Some African democracies struggle to create a single national
identity, because of the diversity of their population and their colonial heritage. Secessionism,
the withdrawal of a group from a nation-state, is a political phenomenon resulting from the
failed projects of national unity that many modern African democracies face today. There are
several examples of secessionist movements across the continent, including the
independentist claims of the Biafra region in Nigeria, the creation of Somaliland in Somalia,
and the birth of South-Sudan. These cases serve as prominent examples of how nationbuilding can divide a state into multiple fictive or real territorial entities.
Cameroon provides a new case of secessionist struggle in Africa. Since November
2016, this Central African country is going through a crisis linked to separatist claims.
Indeed, the movement for Ambazonia, a separatist movement from northwestern and
southwestern regions of the country is protesting the Paul Biya government to obtain the
independence of these Anglophone regions from the rest of the country. The movement is
condemning the marginalization operated by the Biyagovernment towards the English
language in sectors like education, employment, and administration. They want to make the
Anglophone regions a country named Ambazonia. The situation has escalated quickly, since
the separatists started using force. They possess weapons, and they have been held
responsible several attacks and killings in cities like Bamenda, and Douala by the
Cameroonian government. Moreover, 10 separatist leaders, including Julius AyukTabe have
been arrested by Cameroonian authorities in Abuja, Nigeria (Jeune Afrique;2018).
If the separatist issue in Cameroon caught the attention of the international observers
in 2016, the Anglophone separatist claims started in the 1990s. The discontent of the
Anglophone groups towards the Paul Biya administration expressed violently at the
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beginning of the 1990s, but it has been contained for the last 20 years by clientelism, political
and bureaucratic maneuvering, repression, and shared imaginaries like nationalism.
Moreover, the popularity of the Anglophone movements decreased at the beginning of the
2000s

since

the

CPDM,

the

party

in

power

gained

more

popularity

(Pommerolle&Heungoup;2017).
Yet, a puzzle emerges from this fact: Why, despite the loss of popularity of the Anglophone
movement and the centralized power of the Biya regime, has the Anglophone separatist
movement reemerged and gained newfound influence in parts of the country? How has the
movement gained logistical and ideological support?
My thesis draws attention to an under-examined aspect of the secessionist struggle:
the Cameroonian diaspora and the role of the internet. This paper first argues that the
Anglophone crisis is more than an identity struggle between Anglophone/francophone
Cameroonians, but rather a conflict about historical and institutional grievances, political
competition, and regional politics involving the neighboring state of Nigeria.
Second, it verifies the hypothesis that the sustainability of the Anglophone separatist claims
relies on the important support of Cameroonians from the diaspora with the contribution of
the internet and new media of communications. According to this hypothesis, over the years,
this diaspora has contributed to strengthen the Anglophone identity and to maintain a
mobilization of Anglophone Cameroonians on the ground around the idea of an independent
republic, the republic of Ambazonia. This mobilization has been mainly led through the
internet space, especially on social media.
I explain the dynamics of the online mobilization of the separatist Anglophone movements. I
argue that this mobilization is achieved through the spreading of hate speech and
disinformation on social media platform such as Facebook. I also argue that despite an
important virtual mobilization, the Anglophone separatist movements reemerged as
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unstructured entities, composed of multiple armed groups that don’t necessarily cooperate.
Indeed, despite the apparent consensual mobilization around an independent republic of
Ambazonia, it is still hard to perceive any homogeneity in the political and military structure
of this separatist movement. This fragmentation among the Anglophone people make the
political negotiation with the Cameroonian government more difficult to achieve. In addition,
I analyze the perception of this mobilization by international media, by doing a content
analysis of the coverage BBC and Jeune Afrique.
My research combines interviews with Cameroonians involved and not involved in the
Anglophone struggle. My participants were political activists and former government
officers, civil society members, Cameroonian researchers. I also did a content analysis of
Anglophone separatist Facebook Groups. On each group I looked at mobilization videos,
statements, status and comments. In the final chapter, my study also explores potential
measures that have to be taken to handle the crisis. First, it suggests a strengthening of the
decentralization guaranteed by the Cameroonian constitution. Second, it encourages the
humanitarian cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria to keep the stability of their
common border. Finally, it explains that the Anglophone crisis should also raise the
awareness of the international community about the issue of disinformation and propaganda
on the internet during conflict, which is one of our modern day’s challenge.
My research challenges the way secession has been studied by previous scholarship.
By showing the contribution of the diaspora and the internet in Cameroonian Anglophone
crisis, it shows secession as a conflict that transcends the border of the nation state. It
suggests that separatist movements have to be embedded in the globalized and digitized
world in which we live today. In other words, the Cameroonian case is interesting to this
broader separatist literature because it is an opportunity to better understand whether and how
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diaspora use / intervene via social media to support separatist movement, and whether and
how those strategies are effective.
Cameroon is also an important case of secessionism because it is one of the few
countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have known two colonial administrations at the same time
(French and British). This complex past, which also involves historical ties with Nigeria, has
made the process of state building and nation building difficult. This process is currently
experiencing difficulties because of the dissatisfaction of a section of the population of the
northwestern and southwestern regions vis-à-vis the Cameroonian state.
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Section II: Literature Review
My research aims to contribute to the literature on secessionism on the African continent, and
in the world in general. There is an important literature that has explained secessionism in
Africa, and in western democracies like Canada. Indeed, if the secessionist claims of the
movement for Ambazonia constitute a new challenge for the Cameroonian State, it is not the
first case on the African continent. Over the past few years, the birth of new states such as
South Sudan and Somaliland has shown that self-determination claims can lead to secession
and reshape the political geography of a State or a region (Le Goriellec;2011). There is a
significant literature that can contribute to our understanding of secessionism in Africa in
general, and in Cameroon in particular. For this purpose, we found the three following bodies
of literature relevant for our study: State building in Africa (and in Cameroon); identity and
Nation building; Cameroonian socio anthropology.

2.1 State building and secessionism in Africa
The State building in Africa literature can help us understand how the political regime
of the State, its territorial organization, and the management of its resources can either lead to
secession, or can counter it.
First, this body of literature provides an understanding of the context in which African
democracies emerged, and the lacunas that these regimes have today. Indeed, the 1990s
marked the advent of democracy in Africa. New economic partnerships with the West have
led authoritarian leaders to change their rhetoric. Most economic aid from the international
community required the adoption of democratic norms in the aftermath of the cold war as
conditionality. The speech of the French President François Mitterrand during the France-
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Africa Summit held in 1990 in La Baule was part of this logic. Moreover, the geopolitical
change resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent East Wind also had an
influence on the political situation of African countries (Darracq& Magani;2011). However,
despite these important changes, the democratic nature of some African regimes is still
contested. Contested elections, suspicions of cheating, violence against civil society, and
post-election armed conflict are dramatic events that seem to be repeated after every election
in recent years (Gueye;2011). The most recent example of this democratic crisis is Gabon.
Indeed, during the presidential elections of August 27, 2016, the re-election of President Ali
Bongo was challenged by his main opponent, Jean Ping. According to Ping, President Bongo
rigged the votes of the district of HautOgooué. In this constituency, 99% participation of the
population would have been registered, and President Bongo would have won in this one
with 95% of the votes. This instability in the electoral process and institutions that African
democracies encounter provide a room for secessionism to occur.
The claims of secessionist movements often denounce a mismanagement of the
resources by the state. In the context of Cameroon, understanding how the resources are
managed by the state is useful to understand the political and economic context in which the
secessionist claims of the movement for Ambazonia occurred. For this purpose, some
scholars have tried to understand how the mismanagement of resources can shape the sociopolitical and economical life of Cameroon. One of the most used theoretical framework to do
so is the theory of neopatrimonialism. This theory has been developed by Jean-François
Medard, who gave a new form to patrimonialism previously theorized by EISENSTADT
(Eisenstadt;1972). By this term, Medard meant a state practice according to which the ruling
classes tend to appropriate the resources of the state and to manage them and consider them
as a personal patrimony. This approach has been deepened by some other scholars like Van
De WALLE, who developed some terms like presidentialism, that refers to a practice
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whereby a man, usually a president, is erected above the law and above all the powers that
govern a state. This practice is observed in some regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, where there
is a concentration of power at the executive level. This presidentialism gives rise to a status
quo at the level of the allocation of important positions within the state, because the
president, being above the law, is working to allocate the positions to his entourage. (Van De
Walle;2011).
Crawford Young reinforces this connection between the resource management and the
instability of the State in Africa in his piece “Crisis in the Contemporary African State”.
According to him, the crisis of the contemporary state lies on the growing disillusionment
with the performance of the State and the cynicism of the people in many countries about the
ruling groups. He also adds that the other dimension leading to state instability is the
propensity to overconsumption. For example, Young explains that in 1967, the average
fraction of Gross Domestic Products consumed by the African States was less than 15
percent. By 1982, in many states, the figure surpassed 30 percent and in some of them it was
substantially higher.
These theories can be applied to secessionism because they suggest that secessionist
movements might be a response to the failure of the African state. In the case of Cameroon,
these two factors explained by Young apply because the Anglophone crisis is in part due to a
cynicism vis-à-vis the Biya government and the ruling elite, as well as the economic crisis
that prevails in the country (Young;1994).
Furthermore, the literature on state building in Africa provides an understanding to
how the colonial heritage can contribute to the birth of internal conflicts in African States.
Some scholars have looked at the impact of the colonial administration heritage on the
African post-colonial States. Following this idea, in Debating Secession and The Recognition
of New States in Africa, Ian Spears explains how the configuration of frontiers of African
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States played in their instability and can contribute to secession. For instance, Spears argues
that unlike European States which had their boundaries changed over time for optimal
efficiency, newly independent African States kept the same borders. This stagnation of the
borders favorited the creation of states unable to deal with ethnic differences (Spears; 2004).
Achille Mbembe has explained that the instability of some African post-colonial regimes is
due to a lack of rupture with the colonial rule heritage (Mbembe; 2000). The conflict between
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon and the State seems to be a relevant case to illustrate
this theory. Indeed, this crisis is linked to the British and French colonial heritage. For
example, the claims of the movement for Ambazonia include the access to the practice of
English language in education, to a common law juridical system, which have both been
instituted by the British during their administration period. In addition to this, looking at how
the colonial administrations in Africa have drawn the frontiers on the continent is also
relevant for our study.
In a more concrete way, secessionism in the countries of the horn of Africa has also
been explored by the above-mentioned body of literature. Sonia LE Gouriellec (2011)
analyzes the birth of Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland. She explores the internal
processes that led to the Birth of these States. LE Gouriellec argues that cases of secession
have three similar characteristics: they include distinct communities, a territorial dispute, and
a cause of discontentment. The author also argues that language and religion are two factors
that strengthen identities and encourage people to perceive themselves as different while they
are living in the same community. She explains that this strengthening of identity through
language or religion can be an obstacle to the building of a consensual imagined community,
that Anderson (1991) theorized. She also looked at the question of recognition of these three
new States by the international community. She explains that since the recognition of a State
relies on the existence of a population, a government, a territory but also the approbation of
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the international community, the creation of some states such as Somaliland remain
problematic because these requirements are not met (Le Goriellec; 2011).
If State building in Africa literature provides us several useful thoughts, we can also
draw some important arguments from the identity and nation building literature in general.
This body of literature help us understand how the absence of a single national identity and
the existence of multiple ones in some states can lead to some rights claims for minorities. It
also can provide some significant writings that explore how states create institutional
mechanism to deal with the multiple identities in its territory.

2.2 Nation and identity building
In order to understand the roots of the Anglophone crisis and its dynamics, we need to
explore how the Francophone and Anglophone identities have shaped and influenced nation
building in Cameroon. In his piece The Roots of the Anglophone Problem: Language and Politics
in Cameroon, the author Eric.A. Anchimbe has explained the impact of the existence of these

two linguistic identities on the Cameroonian national identity. According to Anchimbe, how
quickly the Anglophone crisis happened can be explained considering the long history of
“Anglophonism” and “Francophonism”. He argues that Anglophone and Francophone
constitute two colonially constructed opposing groups and that the policies of the Biya
government have contributed to strengthen this opposition. The mutual tolerance or
intolerance between these two groups was also shaped through the educational and juridical
policies (Anchimbe; 2018).
Moreover, the literature on nation and identity offers an overview of ethnic conflicts
in African States. For example, Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn (2014) have discussed
the origins of ethnic conflict in African States. They identified the three approaches in which
one could analyze and define ethnic conflict, especially in Ethiopia. They argue that ethnic
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conflict, can exist on, or be examined through three theories, namely, Primordialism,
Instrumentalism and Constructivism. Yet, Engelbert and Dunn explained that ethnic conflict
cannot be separated from African politics (Engelbert& Dunn; 2014). They write: “Many
problems, from corruption to conflict, tend to be attributed to ethnic polarization. The reality
is formidably more complex. Yet there is no denying that ethnicity, in all its ambiguity, lies
center-stage in African politics…”
Still, talking about the relation between African politics and ethnic conflicts, Reno
(1998) uses the theory of warlordism to analyze the role of weak states and warlord politics,
in both creating and perpetuating ethnic violence, especially in African nations. He discusses
how governments and leaders can control the wealth and resources in African nations, thus,
controlling the resources distribution between the different ethnic group. When it comes to
matters of governance, the neoliberal agenda and generating wealth trumps the need to
advance public welfare and the needs of civil society.
Canadian literature on nation and identity building is also useful for our study, since
as Cameroon, the nation building in Canada is in part around bilingualism (French/English).
Following this idea, Wayne Norman has explored these questions by showing how federalism
helps Canada to maintain an equilibrium between its Anglophone provinces and the Quebec
(Norman; 2006). This research is relevant for Cameroon since the country is trying to find
institutional mechanism to accommodate the Anglophone minority of the Northwestern and
Southwestern regions. In the same vein, in his book Politics in the Vernacular, Will
Kimlycka (2011) also addresses the questions around minorities, the rights, and situations of
ethno cultural groups in Western democracies. It presents the role of the State institutions in
the protection of these rights.
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Despite having some relevant thoughts coming from the identity and nation building
literature in general, we still need to look at the writings about the identities in the
Cameroonian context.

2.3 Cameroonian socio-anthropology literature
The body of literature on Cameroonian socio anthropology has explored the different
ethnic divisions, as well as the relationship between the Anglophone and the francophone
populations of the country (Nyamnjoh& Rowlands; 1998). Nyamjoh and Rowlands looked at
how

ethnicity

shapes

the

political

associations

and

belonging

in

Cameroon.

Furthermore, this body of literature also explored the first claims of the Anglophone regions
towards the Cameroonian government from the 1970s to the 1990s (Konings;1996). Konings
explains that it was not until the political liberalization process of the early 1990s that part of
the Anglophone elite began openly organizing in a variety of associations and pressure
groups to press claims for self-determination and autonomy. Moreover, he examines the role
that the chieftaincy has played in these struggles for autonomy. During the era of federalism,
Anglophone chiefs were allowed a large measure of autonomy. After the unification of 1972
the political elite of Cameroon tried to integrate chieftaincy into the State apparatus in a
subordinate position.
2.4 Internet and mobilization literature
The mobilization on the internet is an important part of the Anglophone crisis. For
this reason, the literature on the interaction between the internet and political mobilization is
useful for our study. Following this idea, Eric Anchimbe has studied how the
francophone/Anglophone division was manifested on the blogosphere. Taking the case of
blog forum, Anchimbe analyzed how these two identities were strengthened in that forum,
using inclusion pronouns such as “we”, “our”, “ours”, “us”, ourselves and exclusion
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pronouns. This study could serve as an important base for my research since it shows
evidence of the use of the internet as way to affirm the Anglophone identity in Cameroon and
potentially mobilize Anglophones around the idea of a Republic of Ambazonia.
Understanding the role of the internet in social movements in general can be useful as
well for our analysis. Following this idea, Fekete and Barney (2013) studied how the
distribution of information technologies and the internet have democratized the public debate
in the Arab world. It analyzes how the availability of internet and social media led to the
Arab spring, or the revolution 2.0. The framework provided by this study is useful for our
analysis since it can help us understand how the availability of social media and internet has
democratized the debate about secession among the Anglophone opinion.
Although these bodies of literature provide us a frame to analyze the emergence of
secessionism in Africa in general and in Cameroon in particular, we still find some gaps to
understand the dynamics of the Anglophone separatist claims. Indeed, we want to explain the
variations of the sustainability and the reemergence of these claims despite a centralized
power of the Biya regime. In this study I will examine the component of the network of these
claims, the role of the diaspora in the rises and falls of the movement, especially in the
context

of

the

access

to

internet.

The following sections first show why Cameroon is a particular case of secession in
Africa, as well as why it is more than an identity struggle between Anglophone and
francophone populations. In order to explain that, I made a process tracing of the
Cameroonian state that put in evidence the institutional grievances that led to the conflict.
The process tracing method consist in tracing back the turning points, the major events and
important dates of the history of Cameroon that contribute to establish the current situation.

2.5 Cameroon: A New and Exceptional Case of Secession in Africa
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Cameroon is a new and exceptional case of secession in Africa for several reasons.
First, it is one of the rare states to have undergone such a complex colonial experience. The
country has been first colonized by Germany in 1884. After World War I, following the Paris
peace conference of 1919 Cameroon becomes a territory of the league of Nations and is
placed under the protection of France and Great Britain. The two colonial powers divided the
territory in two parts with two different systems of administration.

Figure 1.1 Map showing the territorial evolution of Cameroon and its Anglophone
region, from the
German colonization to nowadays (Human Rights Watch;2018)

Unlike Nigeria, Somalia or Sudan, Cameroon is the only African state that has been
split into two territories ruled by two different colonial powers at the same time, and to have

21

been reunified after independence. It is the only state where secession comes from this initial
split. This split also involves strong historic ties with Nigeria, which has played an important
role in the sociological, geographical and political configuration of the Anglophone regions
today. Moreover, unlike the previous case of secession on the continent, secession in
Cameroon is not based on ethno-religious cleavage. Indeed, it is based on the linguistic
heritage left by the French and the British rule. After being adopted by the Cameroonian
constitution as the two official languages, English and French became strong identities that
shaped the feeling of belonging of Cameroonians. In other words, the Anglophones and
Francophones constitute two colonially determined and language-based opposing groups.
Cameroonians feel they must fit into one or the other and defend its values (Anchimbe;2018).
The opposition between is one of the main axes of the Anglophone crisis today.
In the Anglophone regions as well as in the francophone regions, these two linguistic
identities are superimposed with other indigenous ethnic identities that have their own
indigenous language. Anthony Ndi, a Cameroonian author and scholar demonstrates the
different ethnic groups in the Anglophone regions.
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Figure1.2Map of the ethnic groups in the Anglophone region (Ndi;2013)
Yet Cameroon still has much in common with other cases of secession in Africa. Indeed, as
in the previous cases, there is a struggle over resources that is also part of the conflict in
Cameroon, mainly around oil. In fact, regions where secessionist movements operate have
important oil fields. One of the important aspects of the Anglophone separatist claims is that
the inhabitants of these region don’t benefit from the exploitation of this oil. This was the
same situation with Nigeria during the Biafra war. The “Biafrais” wanted secession to have
the control over oil in the region (Figaro; 2017).

Country

ethnic issue

religious issue

resource
distribution

Nigeria (Biafra)

yes

yes

yes

Somalia
(Somaliland)

No

yes

yes

(South yes

yes

yes

Sudan
Sudan)
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Eritrea

yes

yes

yes

Cameroon
(Ambazonia)

No

No

yes

Table 1.1 Comparative table of the different cases of secession in Africa

Section III: Conflict history and process tracing of the Anglophone claims
Separatist claims in Cameroon develop from deep historical grievances. Indeed, there
are key moments in the history of the Anglophone regions, formerly known as Southern
Cameroon, that can explain why some Cameroonians from these regions do not feel
belonging to the Cameroonian nation today. In this section, I explore the events and critical
junctures that fueled the feeling of marginalization among Anglophone Cameroonians.
First, I argue that Southern Cameroonians chose to reunify with the French Cameroon
following the UN plebiscite in 1961, not because of a desire to join the French Cameroon, but
rather because of the discontentment of its people towards the British administration, and the
influence of Nigerians in the region (Konings;2005). Second, the choice of reunification was
not satisfying for Southern Cameroonians either since it didn’t give them the autonomy they
were supposed to have in the federal republic of Cameroon. They felt “trapped” by the
Ahidjo administration (Ndi;2013). Finally, since Paul Biya’s rule, the feeling of
marginalization increased because of 35 years of unsatisfying policies and constitutional
mechanisms, clientelism and the centralization of power.
To trace back these important events, I gathered information from Professor Anthony
Ndi’s book entitled Southern, West Cameroon Revisited 1950-1972, which combines
historical data, including the testimonies of Malcolm Milne, former Deputy Commissioner in
Southern Cameroon. I also examined several journal articles from sociologist Piet Konings,
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specialist in political change and regionalism in Cameroon, with a special attention on the
Anglophone regions.
The 1961 Referendum: Southern Cameroons Facing the Cameroon / Nigeria Dilemma
The first element that fueled the Anglophone discontentment is traced back to the
British colonial rule, between 1919 and 1961. Previous and current scholarship on the
Anglophone crisis overlook the dynamics of the British colonial administration in the
Anglophone Cameroon, and the context in which Southern Cameroons chose to reunify with
French Cameroon instead of joining Nigeria as Northern Cameroons did. During this
administration, the British didn’t consider the boundaries between Cameroon and Nigeria that
they were also ruling. This way of administration led to a conflict of interests between
Cameroonians and Nigerians especially in Southern Cameroons (Konings;2005)
Indeed, the absence of boundary between Nigeria and the British Cameroons allowed
Nigerians, in particularly the Igbo tribe to immigrate into Cameroon, and to settle and to take
over some sectors of the economy. The Igbo developed enterprises and imposed themselves
in the commercial sector. However, this dominance of the Igbo was not well received by the
Southern Cameroonians. They dominated the trade market in local food stuffs and imported
goods, palm oil industry, transportation. They took over the economies of cities such as
Kumba, Tiko, Limbe. in the 1950s the Igbo also worked in important local industries such as
the Cameroon Development Cooperation and Pamol. At that time, the Igbo constituted
respectively 25-30 percent and 80 percent of the working force of these societies (Konings;20
05).
This domination of Nigerians was not well received by Southern Cameroonians.
According to Konings: “the Igbo became the victims of verbal and physical attacks by
frustrated local inhabitants and were told to return home. They were accused, usually
fancifully of every vice under the sun: bribery, corruption, narcotics etc. (Konings;2005 -
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P.8)” Moreover, they also felt dominated politically by the Nigerians who seemed to be à
more important colony for the British. Moreover, in response to this Nigerian domination, the
Southern Cameroonians started to ask for more representation in the Nigerian administration.
The British authorities responded to their request by giving them a regional status among the
Nigerian federation. However, with this status, the political autonomy of Southern
Cameroons was limited. If they felt dominated economically by the Nigerians, they also
started to have this feeling politically. They considered they were second-class citizens in the
eyes of the British, and that Nigeria was the favorite territory of the colonial power. This
configuration created by the British administration made gave the impression that Nigeria
was the ruling colonial power in Southern Cameroons (Konings;2005).
This increase of marginalization of Southern Cameroons in the British colonial
empire created an Anglophone Cameroonian nationalism, and a divided opinion regarding the
future of the territory. When time came for southern Cameroonians to choose to join either
Nigeria or Cameroon, they chose Cameroon because it was a way to regain their sovereignty
and resist Nigerian domination in the region. At that time, Anglophone leaders in favor of the
reunification followed the wind of nationalism that leaders like Um Nyobe instigated in the
French Cameroon to gain independence. In 1961 following the referendum organized by the
United Nations, Southern Cameroonians voted to join French Cameroon in a federal republic,
while Northern Cameroons stayed with Nigeria. By making this choice Southern
Cameroonians were convinced that under the federal republic of Cameroon, they could retake
control of their economy and resources. They would be emancipated from the British, their
colonizer and from the Nigerian Igbo domination in the region. This strategic choice shows
that the desire to constitute a single nation with the French Cameroon, to go back to a single
common nation seemed not to be a priority at that time. However, this choice would give rise
to more discontentment a few years later (Ndi;2013).
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1961-1972: The Foumban Conference, then the Unitary State: The Southern
Cameroons “Trapped”
In 1961, everything was set for the reunification between French Cameroonians and
Southern Cameroonians into a federal republic in which Southern Cameroons could have the
autonomy that Nigerian domination didn’t allow them to have. In July 1961, a constitutional
conference was held between the delegates of French Cameroon, led by the president
Ahmadou Ahidjo, and the delegates of Southern Cameroons led by the Prime Minister of
Southern Cameroons, John NguFoncha. In the Anglophone opinion, this conference is
considered as the foundation of the marginalization of the former Southern Cameroonians
under the republic of Cameroon. It is considered as a trap made by Ahidjo and its delegates
that would lead to a more centralized power of the French Cameroon government, and an
increased marginalization of the Anglophones (Ndi;2013).
Indeed, during this conference, Ahidjo came with an already made constitution that
ensured him to keep centralized power despite the federal configuration of the state.
Moreover, according to Anthony Ndi, the British were supposed to make sure the
Anglophone leadership obtained a convenient agreement to preserve their autonomy at the
end of the conference. However, since they were still disappointed by the choice of the
Southern Cameroonians to join Cameroun, they failed to that task. Ndi says: “It comes out
that the British actually masterminded, coordinated and executed their plot to the desired end
since they succeeded in ensuring that Southern Cameroon was finally transferred not to
Foncha or an agreed federal body as stipulated by the United Nations but directly into the
firm grips of the Ahidjo regime, which eliminated all chances of autonomy” (Ndi; 2013).
The result of this “trap” was quickly perceived in the following years, since the
federalism in Cameroon was more centralized than it was supposed to be. Ngoh (2011)
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qualified the Cameroonian state of that period as a “centralized federation”. Moreover,
Konings adds: “federalism has not allowed parity about their cultural heritage and what they
regard as their English-speaking identity. It turned out to be a transitional phase of the total
integration of the English-speaking region into a highly centralized unitary state”.
(Konings;1995).
In 1972, the federation of Cameroon will disappear to be replaced by a unitary
decentralized state. In fact, “Between 1966 and 1970 the ground work for the unitary system
was laid and in 1972 a referendum was held to decide on the transformation of the Federal
Republic into a unitary state, the United Republic of Cameroon” (Tiewa& Vudo;2015). A
referendum was organized by the Ahidjo government in 1972 to vote in favor or against a
new constitution that was changing the Cameroonian state from a federal to a unitary state.
Some Anglophone activists challenged the conditions in which the vote occurred. They argue
that the referendum violated the of the federal constitution that prohibited any revision
without an approval from most deputies from the federated state of west Cameroon. They go
further by adding that the climate of terror of the Ahidjo regime did not favor an open debate
regarding this new constitution and this new form of the Cameroonian state (Tiewa&
Vudo;2015).
At the end of the day, like during the British colonial rule, the Anglophone leadership
and population ended up unsatisfied, subordinated and with a feeling being second-class
citizens. However, the feeling of marginalization of the Anglophones increased in the 1990s,
fostering the creation of more radical Anglophone movements such as separatist movements.
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Figure 2.1: Photo showing on the left, John NguFoncha. On the right the right, Ahmadou
Ahidjo

1990s: Constitutional Pluralism and Rise of Anglophone Separatist Movements
In the 1980s, globalization and the effect of the structural adjustment plans caused the
Anglophones to worry about their economy. The francophone Cameroonians elite dominate
in politics and in the economic sector. For instance, the main petroleum enterprises, the
SONARA that is in the Anglophone regions in Limbe is ruled by a francophone. The
Anglophones feel that their economy will be affected by these important changes and, by the
dominance of the francophone elite. In 1985, an important Anglophone lawyer Fon Gorji
Dinka has been arrested after pointing out this new form of marginalization and calling for
the independence of the Southern Cameroons, for the birth of Ambazonia1.
In the 1990s, a wind of political liberation blows on the African continent. This also
takes effect in Cameroon. This context gave the occasion to many Anglophone political
parties and associations to be created. The Social Democratic Front is created in 1990 with
1

Ambazonia is a term derived from the word Ambas Bay, a bay considered to be the natural boundary of the
former Republique du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons. The name was coined in 1984 by a group led by
FonGorji Dinka, who unilaterally declared the ‘Republic of Ambazonia’ an independent state that would have
comprised all Anglophone Cameroon regions, Northwest and Southwest Cameroon. The term was taken up
again after the 2016 events by pro-independence actors wishing to reassert their identity and separate the
Anglophone regions from the rest of Francophone Cameroon.
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John Nfru Ndi as president. The party became quickly popular in the Anglophone regions,
and all over Cameroon. In the 1992 presidential elections, the SDF realized a score of 86,3%
in the Northwest and 51,6% in the Southwest. This score shows the popularity of this party in
the Anglophone regions. The victory of the CPDM was highly contested this year. The
Anglophones considered it as a stolen victory, and that increased their anger.
Moreover, still following this era of political liberalism, several radical movements emerged.
The Ambazonia movement was one of them. Other groups such as the Cameroon
Anglophone Movement (CAM), the All Anglophone Congress (AAC) also emerge and are
promoting federalism rather than secession (Konings;1996).
In 1993, all the different Anglophone movement and associations reunited as a single
conference to submit some to the Cameroonian government. Moreover, the association of this
movement will also mobilize the international community. They submitted requests to the
UN, to raise awareness about their situation. They tried to rally the Anglophone countries to
their cause so that they could advocate for them and put pressure to the Biya government.
However, their requests never had response (Konings;1996).
Having traced the origins of the Anglophone claims, we understand what the
grievances of the separatist movement are and in partly why it is more than an identity
struggle. The claims evolved over time and reemerged in different context every time. In the
next section, I will develop in which context the Anglophone claims reemerged in 2016 and
present the actors this new form of the conflict engages.

3.2ConflictMapping of the Anglophone Crisis:

3.2.a Conflict Context and Complexity
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The Anglophone crisis must be understood on various levels. Although the origins of
the Anglophone separatist movements and claims are traced back between the 1970s and the
1990s, they reemerged in a precarious socio economic and political context in Cameroon. In
an interview with the magazine Sputnik, Achille Mbembe underlines the social and political
precarity in which the crisis occurs. He says: This Central African country faces a triple
threat. In the Far North, his troops are still engaged in a bitter war, despite notable
successes, against Boko Haram terrorists (Sputnik online; 2018). He adds that as a border of
a Central African Republic struggling to regain its stability after the civil war, the East of
Cameroon suffers the repercussions of the clashes, still ongoing, between different Central
African armed groups.
In addition to the security matters, there is an important social crisis. Social services
are less efficient, and the unemployment rate has increased over time (Sputnik;2018). Yet,
because of this context, the Anglophone crisis engages multiple actors with different interest
at the local, regional and international level. First at the local level, this crisis occurs while
Paul Biya has already totalized 35 years of power. The political status quo created by his long
rule has had important political and economic consequences that encouraged the escalation of
the conflict. Moreover, with 2018 elections, the crisis represents an important electoral issue
for Biya’s party, the CPDM, as well as for its opponents.
At the regional level, the crisis in the Northwestern and Southwestern regions
involves Nigeria which is also affected by the crisis, as a border country to Cameroon.
Nigeria is also an important factor in the history of the Anglophone Cameroon because a part
of this region, the former Northern Cameroon, joined the country following a referendum
organized by the UN in 1961. Since the conflict started, the separatist leaders have been
arrested in Abuja. The Nigerian authorities reaffirmed their will to help the Cameroonian
government fight separatism. Cameroon and Nigeria are also cooperating to fight against
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Boko Haram. The terrorist group has extended its influence in the Extreme North of
Cameroon.
Finally, at the international level, France USA and the UN already stated their
positions about the crisis and are also worried about the transition of power in Cameroon.
The following conflict mapping further develops the context in which separatist claims
reemerged in 2016. It shows the contemporary actors to consider in the development or
resolution of the conflict, and the interests of these different actors.

3.2.b Conflict Parties
A. Primary:
According to Wher (1979), the Primary parties of the conflict are the one whose goals
are, or are perceived by them to be, incompatible and who interact directly in pursuit of those
respective goals. Where the conflict parties are organizations or groups, each may be
composed of smaller units differing in their involvement and investment in the conflict. In the
case of the Anglophone crisis, the primary parties are the Ambazonia separatist movements
and the Cameroonian government.
Ambazonia separatist movements: The Anglophone separatist claims reemerged in 2016,
following the lack of actions from the government towards the peaceful manifestations of
Anglophone teachers and lawyers. It has important support among the diaspora. According to
the website of the movement, there are about 2 million Ambazonians in the diaspora. If the
separatists seem to be in favor of the creation of a Republic of Ambazonia, the opinion is
fragmented through different movements. The following are the one that have been
identified.
The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) is the historical political party that
advocates for the creation of the Republic of Ambazonia. The party is the main platform of
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the Ambazonia movement. The SCNC is currently ruled by Dr Sako Ikome Daniel, since the
former leader, Sissuku Ayuk Tabe has been arrested in Abuja, and is still detained in
Cameroon (Africa News;2018). Since 1995, this political party has been prohibited by the
Cameroonian government since it advocates for secession. The party joined its forces with
the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front. This other group is in favor
of pacific negotiations to obtain independence. However, it is hard to say that the party did
not use violence since the beginning of the conflict. In his first address as new leader, Dr
Sakome announced that it was time for the movement to promote self-defense, therefore
allowing the movement to use armed methods for claims. Sakome said:

“We are therefore going to work to accredit and embrace all self-defense and security groups
that will endorse our IG rules of engagement. I will be reaching out to all in the days ahead,”
(Africa News;2018)

Figure 3.1: Julius Sisiku Ayuk Tabe; separatist leader arrested in Abuja, Nigeria. Behind him,
the Ambazonia flag (Jeune Afrique; 2018)

The Ambazonia Recognition Collaboration Council (ARCC)Ruled by Cho Ayaba and
Ebenezer Akwanga, two former syndicalist students of the university of Buea in exile, this
group assembles multiple armed self-defense groups, such as the Ambazonia Defense Force

33

(ADF), Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (Socadef). These groups claim to be the authors
of several attacks in the region. They also tried to ally with other self-defense groups of the
region such as the Tigers of Ambazonia, the Ambazonia Restauration Army, Ambaland
Forces. Regarding the way, the group operates, Ayaba said:

“We have a block defense strategy: every village, every group of young people can stand up
for Ambazonia, and we will be ready to help them”
(Jeune Afrique;2018)

Cameroonian government (CPDM): The Cameroonian government is against secession.
For the president Paul Biya, the Anglophone separatists are outlaws, terrorists. In an
interview, talking about the Anglophone separatists, Biya claimed that “Cameroon is victim
of a group of terrorists that pretend to be an independentist movement” (Jeune Afrique;
2018). Since the beginning of the crisis, the reaction of the Biya government evolved, allying
at the same time political and military solutions. Following the manifestations of October
2016 of the teachers and lawyers, the government had responded by creating a commission
for multiculturalism and bilingualism and by nominating some Anglophones at strategic
administrative positions. However, the consecutive failures of negotiations, the multiplication
of attacks in the region quickly made the government engage the army in the conflict.
Moreover, since the protests increased in the region, the response of the government to
demonstration became increasingly violent. According to Human Rights Watch, government
security forces responded abusively to the demonstrations in large cities like Buea, Kumba,
including the use of live ammunition against protesters, killing over 20 people wounding
scores of civilians and arresting hundreds (Human Rights Watch; 2018). Since the beginning
of the conflict, soldiers, civilians, clergy members, activists have been victim of the fight
between the government and the separatist armed groups. Recently, Videos have emerged
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from the region, some purportedly showing families being massacred, others detailing the
experience of a woman who claims to have been raped in government custody, and others
documenting beatings and humiliation (Mail & Guardian; 2018).
The Biya government and the CPDM is also worried about the influence of the Anglophone
crisis on the coming elections. Indeed, the instability of these regions discredits Paul Biya,
who has officially declared his intention to run for one more term as president. The
opposition also use his incapacity to manage and handle the crisis to encourage the people to
vote for a new president in the presidential elections of October 7th. In early 2018, the
opposition has described Biya’s state record as “chaotic” (Africa News; 2018).
B. secondary:
The secondary parties of the conflict are the one who have an indirect stake in the outcome of
the dispute but who do not feel themselves to be directly involved. As the conflict evolves,
the secondary can become primary and vice-versa. (Wehr;1979)
Nigeria:
Nigeria is an important factor in the conflict for many reasons. First, as we mentioned earlier
this country has strong historical ties with Cameroon. Indeed, since the beginning of the
British colonization, there has always been a lot of migrations and trade between Nigeria and
the Anglophone region. Since the beginning of the conflict, these migrations and trade
dynamics have been deeply affected. Indeed, the biggest traders in the region, originally from
Nigeria, who have traditionally run in the region went back to their home country for safety
reasons. Moreover, victims of the conflict are also fleeing to Nigeria. According to the
UNHCR, the numbers of Cameroonians seeking asylum in Nigeria has doubled since midJanuary. About 20,000 refugees have been registered in some states such as Cross River,
Taraba, Benue, Akwa-Ibom. The Nigerian government is against the presence of separatist on
its territory. Indeed, the government has manifested his non-approbation of the Anglophone
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separatist movement by arresting about 40 separatists on its soil on January 2018 (Africa
News; 2018). The position of the Nigerian State is understandable since it has been struggling
with separatism in the Southeast part of its territory, with the secession of the former “Biafra”
republic, which shared a border with the Anglophone region. The instability of the
Anglophone regions and the proliferation of criminal armed groups at across this border
could recreate an instability in Southeast Nigeria. Recently Ben Ayade, the Governor of the
Cross-River State in Nigeria expressed his concerns about the instability that the Anglophone
crisis brings in Nigeria. He claimed that: “80 percent of security issues we are dealing with is
a result of the war just by our borders”. There is an influx of persons into Nigeria through
over 27 illegal routes, who smuggle in goods of different kinds, sell them and use the money
to acquire arms, recruit our young men and women and use them as machineries to fight
back home,”
However, Ayade complained about the lack of assistance of the Nigerian government to face
the humanitarian and security challenge in the Cross-River State. According to the latest
UNHCR report, ninety-five per cent (95%) of the asylum seekers have no more than three
days of food. Most families are down to one meal per day. The coping strategies people are
using are themselves risky. The implication of Nigeria is certainly important to consider for
the future developments of the conflict. If Nigeria and Cameroon are currently cooperating to
put an end to the threat of Boko Haram in the far North, they must intensify this cooperation
for the stability of the frontier between the Anglophone regions and the management of the
crisis. In the last chapter of this essay, we will further develop in the final chapter of this
essay. We will explore what have already been done by the two countries, what are the
obstacles of this cooperation, and what kind of routes and solutions could emerge from such a
mutualization of efforts.
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Figure 3.2 Map of the former republic of Biafra, established by secessionists in
Southeast Nigeria in the 1960s (Le Figaro;2017)

Opposition political parties:SDF, PDF, CRM
In the context of the upcoming presidential elections of October 7th, some political parties of
the opposition can be considered as actors in the evolution of the Anglophone crisis. Indeed,
we identified here 3 main political parties that took a stand about the conflict in the
Anglophone regions. Our interest in these political parties also relies on the background of
their candidates, which involves historic ties with the region, its people and its surroundings.

Social Democratic Front (SDF):
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Founded in 1990 in Bamenda, this political party was created following the Anglophone
frustration towards the dominant francophone political elite, and the era of political
liberalization of the 1990’s. Formerly ruled by the charismatic leader John Fru Ndi, this party
has always been the direct opposition to the CPDM. The SDF used to be the main defender of
the Anglophone claims. However, with time, some Anglophones claimed that the party
became more a national party than an Anglophone party. Since the beginning of the conflict
the SDF has been putting pressure on the Biya government to break its silence and to adopt a
dialogue with the Anglophone protesters. Nonetheless, the party is against the secession of
the region. Following the election of its new president Joshua Oshi who is also candidate at
the national presidential election of October, the party affirmed thinking about federalism to
put an end to the Anglophone discontentment.
On November 26th, 2017, John FruNdi met with the president of the Anglophone civil
society consortium, AgborBalla, Simon Munzu and Prince Ekosso to discuss about potential
peaceful solutions and to create a national dialogue. as the main opposition party to the
CPDM, the SDF do not hesitate to point out the Biya’s incapacity to handle the crisis. The
discontentment of the Anglophone over the years and the reemergence of the crisis is one of
the main arguments the party uses to discredit the current administration. As we mentioned
earlier in our process tracing of the Anglophone grievances, the popularity of the SDF has
always been at its summit when Anglophone claims emerged. However, it will be interesting
to know if there is a certitude that such a phenomenon reproduces for the upcoming
presidential elections.
The People’s Development Front (PDF)
The PDF is a new party in the Cameroonian political landscape. This is initially a movement
named NOW which brings together civil society associations and other political parties. Its
president and candidate are Akere Muna is originally from the Anglophone regions and is the
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son of a former Prime minister of the Anglophone region, Salomon Tabeng Muna.
Anglophone lawyer and figure of the fight against corruption, he kept a long distance from
politics, but decided, at age 65, to embark on the race. Akere Muna has great influence
abroad, thanks to his experience at Transparency International, where he was vice-president,
or to his former positions as president of the Pan African Lawyers Union (UPA) and of the
Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union. (Jeune Afrique; 2018)
As the other opposition political parties, the PDF is worried about taking down the Biya
government and the system it established. Its candidate Akere Muna has expressed its will to
focus on the fight against corruption, unemployment and clientelism. Moreover, the candidate
also shared its concern about the transparency and the viability of the upcoming elections. He
stated that he wanted to have at least 15 members of his team in each of the 30000 polling
stations in order to ensure the fairness of the vote (Jeune Afrique;2018)
The Anglophone crisis have a meaning for Akere Muna. Indeed, coming from the
Anglophone regions he positions himself as the candidate who is more able to understand the
Anglophone claims. In an interview with Jeune Afrique, Muna said “The only person that
can handle the secessionists is an Anglophone president”. The candidate clearly positioned
himself against separatism, and as Joshua Oshi, the candidate of the SDF, he is in favor for a
national dialogue to solve the conflict.
The Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM)
Founded in 2012 and led by Maurice Kamto, a former CPDM member and government
officer, the CRM is relatively popular in the West Cameroon. Former Minister of Justice
(2004-2011), Maurice Kamto, eminent law professor is known to have overseen the
settlement of the dispute between his country and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. Few
times after its creation, the party expressed its concerns regarding the Anglophone claims the
and the tumultuous relationship the Anglophone population had with the Cameroonian
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government. Unfortunately, according to Kamto, the government did not listen to the alarm
bell of the MRC, and in November 2016, the "Anglophone crisis" broke out. Since the
outbreak of the crisis, the President of the Republic, which, by the Constitution, is the
embodiment of national unity, guardian of the Constitution, guarantor of the integrity of the
territory, the permanence and the continuity of the State, should have gone to the Regions
concerned to reassure the population, to listen directly to their demands in order to provide
the most appropriate solutions to their malaise in the Nation. As the other opposition leaders,
Kamto uses the incapacity of Biya to handle the crisis as a strong argument to discredit him
and his government. As solutions to solve the crisis the CRM proposes to create a political
delegation which includes clergy members, traditional chiefs, and parliament representatives
who will have for mission to establish a dialogue between the population of the Anglophone
regions and the government.
As we can see the major opposition parties and political leaders have a common goal which is
to put an end to the rule of Biya. They are all for the creation of a national dialogue in order
to manage the conflict. After the release of the official date for the elections, the some of the
opposition leaders mentioned their intention to make a coalition to be able to take down the
popularity of the CPDM. However, these intentions have not been concertized with actions
yet. Recently asked to build an opposition coalition with Maurice Kamto (CRM) and Akere
Muna (PDF), the candidate Joshua Osih, native of Kumba preferred to decline. (Jeune
Afrique; 2018).

40

Figure3.3 List of the official candidates for the presidential elections of October 7th
C. Interested third parties:
The interested third parties are the one who have an interest in the successful resolution of the
conflict. In the context of the Anglophone crisis we can identify the UN, the US, the UK as
some fitting in that category.
International community.
The Anglophone crisis clearly caught the attention of the international community. From the
beginning of the crisis, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres manifested his concerns
about the situation in the region. He has called for the government to initiate a national debate
and look at the deep roots of the problem. Guterres has said the UN is against secession and
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that the integrity and the unity of the territory is important. Moreover, this position of the UN
is understandable since according to Sonia Le Goriellec2 , even if the international
community recognizes the right to self-determination, it usually prefers political autonomy
rather than secession when separatist claims occurs in a state. Nonetheless, in the case of
Cameroon, the UN is also against secession because the organization wants to respect the
outcome of the plebiscite it organized in 1961, which was the reunification of the
Anglophone Cameroon with the French Cameroon.
The United States also stated its position and concerns regarding the conflict. Indeed, the US
firmly condemned the human rights violations3.The country also urged the Cameroonian and
Nigerian authorities to adhere their obligations under international law to refrain from
forcible returns to asylum-seekers back to their country of origin, especially the asylumseekers currently in Nigeria. In early May 2018, the US ambassador in Cameroon expressed
his concerns about the reaction of the government in the crisis. He denounced a "policy of
targeted killings", "arrests without access to a lawyer, the family or the Red Cross", as well as
the existence of "villages burned and looted by the government" in the English-speaking area
". The ambassador also denounced, the violence of the separatists, stressing the "killings of
gendarmes, kidnappings of officials and fires of schools" (Jeune Afrique; 2018).
The US have interests that the instability in Cameroon might compromise. Indeed, since
1960, the United States and Cameroon are working closely in important fields such as that
address democracy and governance, regional security, environmental protection, health, and

2

Sonia Le Gouriellec, « Trois trajectoires de sécession dans la Corne de l'Afrique : le
Somaliland, l'Érythrée, le Soudan du Sud », Sécurité globale 2011/4 (N° 18),
p. 95-106.
DOI 10.3917/secug.018.0095
3
US State Department website: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277988.htm
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economic development. The two countries are also commercial partners and have signed free
trade agreements such as the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)4.
The US is not the only country to express its concerns about the Anglophone crisis. The
conflict has also caught the attention of the United Kingdom. The issue has been raised in the
House of Commons by MP Jessica Morden, who has traveled in the region. She expressed
her concern about the situation of the refugees fleeing in Nigeria. The minister for Africa,
responded by reaffirming the position of the UK, which is to promote dialog in the conflict as
well as the end of violence in the region (Africa news; 2017) 5. Some British companies have
an interest in the stability of the Anglophone regions. Indeed, in 2015, the energetic group
Tower Resources has signed a partnership with the National Hydrocarbons Society to share
the benefits of the oil exploitation of the Rio Del Rey Basin, around the southwestern region
of Cameroon.
Finally, a couple of NGOs are on the field trying to put pressure on the Biya government to
stop the violence occurring in the region and to protect people’s Human rights and propose
peaceful solutions. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group
are a couple of them.
We can observe that among the international community, secession is not an option. The
stability and the dialog are proposed as solutions for two reasons which are the respect of
territorial integrity, human rights and peace promoted by international law, and the protection
of some economic interests in the regions.

4

Office of the United States trade Representative website: https://ustr.gov/countriesregions/africa/cameroon
5
http://www.africanews.com/2018/05/17/cameroon-anglophone-crisis-raised-in-uk-parliament//
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Figure 3.4 Map summarizing the actors in the Anglophone crisis and their different positions
and interests

Section IV: Research design, methodology and case selection

The aim of my research is to study two overlooked aspect of the Anglophone crisis, which
are the role of the diaspora and the internet. Indeed, the existing knowledge on the problem
focuses on the fight between the Anglophone and francophone identities, and the role of the
Cameroonian government in this struggle. If the role of the diaspora and the internet has been
mentioned in many news articles about the problem, scholars haven’t fully explored these
major aspects of the conflict. My study analysis the organizational relationship between the
diaspora and the protest groups on the ground. It is an attempt to verify if there is a link
between the mobilization on the internet led by the diaspora and the actions of the different
groups currently protesting in Cameroon.
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The overall of my research combines interviews of Cameroonians originally and nonoriginally from the Anglophone region, an immersion in the Facebook sphere of the
Anglophone separatist movements, and a content and discourse analysis. The goal of this
research methods was to verify the two hypothesis that guide my research:
1) The Anglophone separatists’ movements receive an important support from the
Cameroonian diaspora, which helps them sustain over time
2) The internet is a bridge between this diaspora and the forces that are fighting on the
ground, ensuring the communication, and the logistical support needed.
Also, by allying the interviews to my immersion in the internet sphere of the movement my
goals were to compare the narratives on the ground to the one on the internet social media.
4.1 Interviews
The interviews of my research were conducted face to face. In case a participant could not
meet, a phone interview was made. The face-to face interviews were made in public spaces,
namely coffee shops, work offices, universities, hotel lounges. I conducted the interviews
among the Cameroonians living in the country and the one from the diaspora living outside
the country. The interviews were conducted in Cameroon in cities like Douala, Yaoundé,
Buea and in the United States in San Francisco and the Bay Area. My interview participants
were man and woman that are at least aged 21. I reached out to my participants using a
snowball method, in other words, by taking contact with one that could connect me to others.
Since the topic is currently sensitive in the country, I made my participant read a consent
form that was clearly explaining the purpose of the study and that guaranteed that the data I
will collect will be used exclusively for the purpose of the study, and that their identity will
be protected. Yet, some of the participants leaving outside the country were not exposed to
any risk of deportation since they have another nationality and they legally beneficiate from
the protection of the country they live in. Nonetheless some of my participants manifested the
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will to have their identity revealed in the study, so that their voices and opinions about the
conflict could be heard. Moreover, since I couldn’t go in Buea (in the Anglophone region),
because I was not in possession of a Cameroonian national identity card, I hired a PhD
student of the university of Buea to whom I sent my questionnaire and who did 3 interviews
in the city for me. He followed the rules of procedure I established for my research and that I
mentioned earlier in this section. He audio-recorded the interviews so that I was able to verify
the procedure was clearly followed and that the participants genuinely stated their willingness
to contribute to the study.
Using open-ended questions the following themes were discussed: a general introduction of
the participant, and his background, his perception of the crisis in general , of the diaspora ,
the Anglophone political mobilization, and the internet in the conflict. With their written and
verbal consent, the interviews were audio-recorded in order to preserve the accuracy of the
responses. The interviews lasted approximately one hour. Some of my participants accepted
to be audio-recorded, others choose to have an informal conversation during in which I could
take notes to gather relevant elements and quotes from the conversation.
After realizing my interviews, I transcribed them and did a content analysis of the transcripts.
Indeed, in each transcript I categorized the statements of my participants into the following
themes: Diaspora, Internet, armament, funding, military organization, political organization,
fragmented organization, cohesive organization, government’s reaction, other
The goal of this categorization was to identify if my participants could validate or invalidate
the hypothesis that the separatist’s claims were supported by Cameroonians outside the
country and from where. I also wanted to capture if they have a sense on how the movement
is organized and which role the internet plays in that structure. How can they be in possession
of weapons? How do they coordinate their operations on the field? Is there a link between the
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propaganda on social media and the actions of the armed groups on the field? Who are the
main leaders and movements?
Findings
My participants were from different backgrounds. I conducted semi-structured interviews
with key informants with specialized knowledge of the Anglophone crisis. They included
journalists, activists, and other members of civil society working on peacebuilding and other
efforts in Cameroon. Some had English as first language, others had French as a first
language. Some were originally from the Anglophone region, some were not. Some were
directly politically involved, some others not. from all the 10 interviews I conducted, 6
participants accepted to be audio-recorded and provided me relevant elements regarding my
hypothesis. Without revealing further details that could help identify my participant, I provide
bellow this is an explanation of each profile because the positionality and the background of
each participant matters to understand his/her opinion about the crisis.
Participant 1: Is a francophone Cameroonian who lives in Douala. He went to college in
Nigeria and in the Anglophone region. He travels constantly between Nigeria and the
Anglophone regions. He seemed to have an important knowledge of the area. Because of his
work, he can hear about the crisis in his daily life. Following this idea, he did a lot of field
investigation regarding the conflict. He is not for secession.
Participant 2: Is a francophone Cameroonian, originally from the French side of the country
who used to live in Canada for studies, but who went back to Cameroon for professional
reasons. His experience and knowledge of the crisis is based on the situation he lives as
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member of an opposition party, and on his conversations with his close friends. He is not for
secession.
Participant 3: Is an Anglophone Cameroonian researcher, who was born and raised in the
Anglophone region, but who lived in Yaoundé, in the francophone side of the country for his
studies. His knowledge of the conflict comes from his personal experience. He is for a pacific
secession.
Participant 4: Is an Anglophone Cameroonian born and raised in the Anglophone region. He
has always lived in the Anglophone region, more precisely in Buea. He is claims to be in
favor of secession, but through a democratic way.
Participant 5: Participant 5 is an Anglophone Cameroonian born in the Anglophone region,
living in the francophone region in Douala. he is not for secession, despite having lived he is
for federalism.
Participant 6: Is an Anglophone Cameroonian born and raised in the Anglophone region. He
is for a peaceful secession
Participant 7: is a francophone Cameroonian who was born and raised in Yaoundé but who
studied in Buea. He is not for secession
Participant 8: is also a francophone Cameroonian, was also born and raised in Yaoundé,
never left the city and is against secession.
Participant 9: Is a francophone Cameroonian historian. Born and raised in Douala in the
francophone region. He is against secession
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Participant 10: Is a francophone Cameroonian born and raised in the Est region on the
francophone side of the country. He is against secession.
The interview questions asked can be found in the following table. During the conversations I
also asked some follow-up questions depending in the responses of the participants that are
not on the sample.

Interview questions sample
Relation with Cameroon
1) Can you tell me a little bit about yourself?
2) From which region/province of Cameroon are you?
3) Is English or French your first language?
Political engagement and perception the Anglophone cause:
4) Do you have any political engagement inside or outside the country related to Cameroon? If
yes, tell me more about it.
5) How did hear about the Anglophone crisis? And what do you think about the current
situation?
6) What do you think about the conflict and how does it influence your daily life?
7) Do you support the independence of the Anglophone regions? why?
8) Do you have any relatives in these regions?
9) Are you familiar with the history, structure, and organization of the movement for
Ambazonia? Can you explain?
10) Have you ever heard about a support from Cameroonian outside the country to the separatist
cause?
Communication strategies
11) Since the beginning of the crisis, we have seen a couple of internet cuts in the Anglophone
regions. According to you, what is the role of the internet in the Anglophone struggle?
12) yes, which one?
13) Do you have any alternatives to communicate with the people in the Anglophone regions or
the movement for Ambazonia?

Multiple themes were discussed during the interviews, however I put an emphasis on the role
of the diaspora and the internet during the conversations. This diagram is a breakdown of
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these different themes. It shows how many conversations covered each theme, and how I
coded the different themes in my transcripts for more efficiency.

Figure 4.1: Diagram showing the themes discussed during the interviews

Participant

First language

For secession?

from the NW/SW?

Participant 1

French

No

No

participant 2

French

No

No

Participant 3

English

Yes

Yes

Participant 4

English

Yes

Yes

Participant 5

English

No

Yes
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Participant 6

English

yes

Yes

participant 7

French

No

No

Participant 8

French

No

No

Participant 9

French

No

No

Participant 10

French

No

No

4.1.a The Diaspora
Only 40% of my interview participants tend to be sure about the support of the diaspora and
its role as principal actors of mobilization around Anglophone separatism. However, within
the 60 % left, nobody totally denied the idea. Some participants preferred to skip the question
because of a lack of information, or just said they were not aware about it. In the range of
participants who recognized the role of the diaspora, they seem to all agree about their role in
the virtual mobilization on social media.

For instance, for participant 1, the role of

Anglophone diaspora is to operationalize the existence of the virtual Republic of Ambazonia.
They make Ambazonia exist on all social media, Facebook, WhatsApp etc. (participant 1
interview; 15:20)”.
During our conversation, he mentioned that Cameroonians in the US, the UK, and in Nigeria
tend to spread hatred messages on social media, disinformation in order to encourage
population on the field to join armed groups and fight for the independence of the
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Anglophone region. Giving an example to prove his statement, he declared: “they send
manipulated videos of UN peacekeepers in Buea, and all, but we know the UN peacekeepers
do not arrive at Buea without resolution. When we look at WhatsApp conversations, they
announce a lot of things that do not exist, and that's what motivates all the small groups on
the ground waiting for the reinforcements (Participant 1 Interview; 16:30)”
However, according to him, despite the virtual mobilization they achieve, they remain
disconnected to the reality of the field. Some Cameroonians outside the country improvise
themselves as military chiefs without even knowing about military strategy, or without
knowing the composition of the groups they motivate.
I didn’t identify any language expressing hesitation, or doubt in the statements of participant
1 regarding involvement of the diaspora. He seemed convinced of his affirmations.
Moreover, he positionality as an investigative journalist during the crisis seemed to give him
legitimacy to make such declarations.
Participant 2 also confirmed the tendency of Cameroonians outside the country to support
separatism and seemed to have an insight of what motivates their “radicalization”. During a
trip in Washington D.C this participant encountered and discuss with several Anglophone
Cameroonians living in the area and realized how much the opinions were in favor of
separatism, in favor of the creation of the Republic of Ambazonia. He says: “In February I
went for personal reasons in Washington D.C and took the opportunity to prepare the visit
Me Akere Muna who visited in May. And that's where I realized how much our diaspora was
really radicalized, for the secession. (Participant 2 Interview; 20:36)
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I followed up on this statement by asking why, according to him the opinion of the diaspora
seemed to be radicalized and according to him, the ignorance and increasing violence of the
government towards the Anglophone protesters: “The speech I've heard that has come back
even now is to say that the first leaders who were imprisoned were moderate people who
preached federalism, who spoke out in dialogue. The government did not want to open the
door to a reflection on the organization of the State, to put these leaders in prison and thus
those who remained in prison succeeded in radicalizing the local populations”. (Participant 2
interview; 21:00).
According to him, the radicalization of some Anglophone Cameroonians living outside the
country is due to a frustration towards the government, that is intensified by the killings. he
argued that Today these brothers of the diaspora and these local brothers have lost brothers
have lost sisters and do not have the impression that the government reaches out to them, and
therefore do not find themselves really in this Cameroonian nation.” (Participant 2 interview;
22:08)
However, participant 4 provided more distance regarding the involvement of the diaspora.
Using a language reflecting doubts and hesitation, he said:
I think that I don’t have enough proof of that because it is social media that have brought the
diaspora supporting the Ambazonia movements, financially, military and so on. But there is
many false information on social media. Nothing that I have seen on social media concerning
the support of Ambazonia is the true record of what I think is happening. (Participant 4
interview; 15:13)
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Even if I couldn’t gather enough evidence regarding the involvement of the diaspora in the
Anglophone struggle, due to a limit of time and due, this hypothesis remains important and
must be further explore in future studies. As I previously mentioned, even if some
participants didn’t respond to the question, they didn’t deny the idea.

4.1.b Disinformation on Social Media
100% of my participants considered that the internet, especially social media such as
Facebook, as a core element in the Anglophone mobilization and in the intensification of the
conflict. For all of them, the internet and social media are used by separatists to spread hatred
and disinformation. Using affirmative sentences, and without any language of hesitation,
Participant 4 pointed out the mediatic manipulations, and the fake news about the
Anglophone region that circulate on Facebook. For him,
The internet has been used as a mean to incite or instigate more riots in the two Anglophone
regions. This is in the sense that more often, people can pick pictures of issues that are
happening elsewhere and paste it on the internet, making people believe it is happening
villages in Cameroon. (Participant 4 interview; 20:16). For participant 2, the use of internet
and the mediatic manipulation is not only done by separatists. It is used by the three major
parties of the conflict which are the government, the separatist, and the people in favor of
federalism. First, the government uses social media to show how the police are attacked. For
example, when there is a gendarme who is killed, the government uses social media to show
how much they are dealing with secessionist terrorist, barbarians (Participant 2 interview;
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26:17). On the separatist side, extremists amplify their messages and are especially
mischievous to use videos that are not shot in Cameroon. He found videos that came from
Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire that were used to show that the Cameroonian army is killing
people. And then in the middle there are the moderates who try to convey a message of
appeasement. (Participant 2 interview; 27:00)
For participant 1 internet and social media is a way to inform and coordinate and the
secessionists groups. According to him, it is on the social media that they communicate. Fake
news is shared through audio messages, video messages through WhatsApp groups,
Facebook groups. In the same vein, the shared information helps keep build and maintain the
Ambazonian mythology. (Participant 1 interview; 15:15)
Internet and social media have not only served as platforms for the spreading of
disinformation. my participant also considered the positive impact of this technology.
Participant 4 also considered social media as a tool to raise awareness about the conflict and
to alert villagers to leave their villages before they are attacked. It has fostered the dialog
between people. People are aware about what is discussed. It has exposed a lot of hidden
documents, documents that concern the history of the Anglophones (participant 4 interview;
19:33).
I decided to verify these affirmations about social media by doing an anonymous immersion
in separatist Facebook groups. I will present my findings in the next section. Other themes
such as the perception of the crisis, the military organization of the movement or the regional
dynamic of the conflict also came out of my conversations with my participants.
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4.1.c The Cameroon and Nigeria relations in the Anglophone crisis
Talking about the dynamics of the conflict in general, some participants claimed that the
border of the region with Nigeria has always been the ground for high criminality. Participant
1 who conducted investigations in the region claimed that the conflict gave more opportunity
to criminal groups to continue activities such as drug and oil trafficking. Indeed, according to
this participant, the accessibility and the lack of security at the border between Cameroon and
Nigeria is a factor to consider in the increase of killings and kidnappings in the regions. He
claimed that probably some criminal groups that are operating between Cameroon and
Nigeria are using the Anglophone political struggle to enrich themselves. He said “when the
supposed separatists kidnap people, they ask for money to the government. Which political
group does this kind of things? You clearly see that some of them are just criminals that try to
make money”. He also explained the closeness of south east Nigeria which has faced
separatist struggles in the 1960s to the Anglophone region is another factor that the State
should take in consideration, because it could play a role in the dynamics of the conflict.
Participant10, also expressed some concerns about how the relationship between Cameroon
and Nigeria plays into the current conflict in the Anglophone region. According to this
participant, “You can’t think about handling the Anglophone crisis, and even the future of
Cameroon without thinking about Nigeria”. (Participant 10 interview; 17:15) He said that the
two countries have always been in territorial conflict in the surroundings of the Guinea Gulf
and the Anglophone region because of oil, fight over the Bakassi peninsula is one example of
these struggle. He added that if the Anglophone region becomes independent, Cameroon will
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lose the control over oil and will be vulnerable in front of the neighboring Nigeria, who could
take advantage of this situation in many points.
4.d. Fragmented military and political organization of the Anglophone separatist
movement
All Cameroonians supporting the Anglophone separatist movement seem to agree on the
idea of the creation of the Republic of Ambazonia. However, the separatist movement seem
not to have a single consensual political structure. When asked if they were familiar with the
political structure of the movement, Participant 5,3,4 and 1 claimed that it was unclear.
According to them the leadership is fragmented, and there are multiple small political groups.
The different politic groups also seem not to agree on the way to achieve the independence.
Some of them are in favor of a political and pacific dialog, and others prefer an armed
revolution.
The military organization is also fragmented according to the participants. Indeed, there are
multiple armed groups on the ground that seem not to be operating or coordinating together.
In addition, participant 1 explained that these groups are not always led by individuals with
military experience. He mentioned that they are sometimes led by Cameroonians who live
outside the country and who have no sense of what is happening on the ground. He also
mentioned that the weapons in possession of the groups are weapons coming from former
Niger Delta soldiers or from Cameroonian soldiers dead during assaults. (Participant 1
interview)
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I found the declarations of my participants about the organization interesting. Even if they
didn’t provide enough insights to have a full knowledge of the dynamics of the movement,
these claims must be considered. The fragmentation of the movement could be one of the
reasons why the different political negotiations that the movement made with the government
over the years have not produced concrete resolutions.
4.2 Facebook groups content analysis
The use of internet in the Anglophone struggle and the Anglophone identity building has
been previously studied by Anchimbe. Indeed, in his article Digital Narratives as
Anglophone or Francophone in a Cameroon Online News Forum, the author describes
patterns of belonging to the historical (colonial) linguistic in-group Anglophone and outgroup francophone in Cameroon in an online news forum named The Post Newspaper. The
author focused on the use of eight plural pronouns and how they index in-group or out-group
belonging. According to Anchimbe, four of the pronouns, we, our, us and ourselves are used
inclusively to create a solid Anglophone in-group through the narration of a common
(colonial) history, linguistic background (the use of English) and experiences. The other four,
they, them, their and themselves refer predominantly to francophone as an out-group that
must be differentiated from the close-knit Anglophone in-group. Achimbe’s study in some
way serves us as evidence showing how the internet might have been used to strengthen the
Anglophone/francophone division over the years.
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Figure 4.2 Diagram of the use of inclusive pronouns by Anglophones in Anchimbe’s
study (Anchimbe; 2016)

Figure 4.3 Diagram of the use of inclusive pronouns by Anglophones in Anchimbe’s
study (Anchimbe; 2016)
Since the beginning of the conflict, the Anglophone separatist groups are spread out on the
internet sphere. As Anchimbe, we want to capture the digital dynamics of the conflict and the
Anglophone claims. Following Manuel Castell’s theory which states that social movements
operate through networks to bring social change. Castells argues that these networks can be
constituted by different stakeholders such as the media, I tried to identify the mediatic/
internet network of the Anglophone separatist movements and groups. I have identified, 4
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principal sectors, of the internet in which the separatist claims are being formulated: The
Ambazonia Republic website, ambagov.org6, the Ambazonia YouTube Channel, The
Ambazonia Facebook groups, and some international media.
For the purpose of this study, and because of the time allowed for it, I choose to focus only
on Facebook. Moreover, on this platform, we can find content coming from the other spheres
of expressions of the movement previously mentioned above. Indeed, On Facebook, we can
find content coming from the YouTube channel of the movement, the websites etc.

Facebook sphere:
A lot of groups have been created on Facebook to support the Anglophone cause, either
separatism or more peaceful claims. I aimed to immerse in some of these groups to capture
their narratives. As I did for my interviews, my goal was to verify if in the discourse and the
narratives we could find any mention to hate speech, disinformation and to the diaspora, for
this purpose I made a discourse and content analysis of posts (status, videos, comments) in
6

https://ambagov.org/pages/scbc-tv
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the different groups. Following this idea, I created an anonymous Facebook account, with a
new email address. To protect my safety, I did not add any profile picture, I wrote down a
fake name that I will not reveal in this study. I did not add any friend, to avoid being traced or
associated with someone. To find the groups, I made a research on the platform using the
keywords “Southern Cameroons”, “Ambazonia”. As a result, around 50 groups appeared.
However, I narrowed the number of groups I will enter to 15. The 15 groups were selected
based on the number of members and of posts per days. On the one hand, the groups that had
less of 81 members were not selected. Moreover, the group I chose had a post frequency
between 6 to 10 per day each. Having selected these groups, I observed and analyzed their
contents in order to verify my hypothesis.

Name of the Facebook

Number of members

Southern Cameroon-Ambazonia Resistance 74255
Front
SCNC Official (The Truth of matter)

38429

Southern Cameroon People Organization

17670

Southern Cameroons Teachers Forum

17705

Southern Cameroons Republic

10581

Southern
Cameroons
consortium news outlet

Ambazonia 7321

Southern Cameroons Cry

7165

Southern Cameroons Forum

7085

Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Family 6120
Movement
Southern Cameroons Hashtag Community

5285

Free Southern Cameroons

3605

Southern Cameroons Freedom Fighters

692
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Southern Cameroons Liberation Movement

278

Southern Cameroons Civil Defense

87

Southern Cameroons Forum

81

Table 4.2 Table of the selected Facebook groups and their number of members

Figure 4.4 Diagram of the Frequency of posts in the selected Facebook groups
Findings
In this section I aim to present evidence of the spreading of hate speech and disinformation
on social media in the context of the conflict, as my participant claim during the interviews. I
also aim to identify possible elements related to Cameroonian outside of the country
supporting the separatist struggle. I first present recent similar studies that show these
evidences, and finally I present the findings the evidences coming from an immersion I did in
Facebook groups. Since I don’t have the consent of the people on these groups I blurred or
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avoided to show the names of the Facebook accounts in the examples I present. I also
avoided to show the faces and any information that can help identify people.
4.2.a Hate Speech on Facebook
As my participants claimed, recent studies on social media in the context of the Anglophone
crisis have shown an important spreading of hatred speech on Facebook. Indeed, PeaceTech
Lab7 has conducted a research on the online hate narratives during Anglophone Crisis.
After conducting interviews and survey, the researchers identified inflammatory words used
on social media that intensifies the conflict between Anglophones and francophone. The
report identified words such as: Terrorist, Anglo-fou, Ambazo, Ambazonia, Biafra as the most
used and to stimulate hatred on Facebook or twitter.
However, the report does not focus only on the Anglophone narratives, it also focuses on the
francophone ones. The aim of this report was to contribute to the fight against disinformation
and hate speech on social media in political contexts.

7

PeaceTech Lab study on social media in conflicts https://www.peacetechlab.org/lexicons/
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This sample taken from the report shows the hate words mentioned above used in a post.
These words are pejorative words towards Anglophones. Anglo-fou is a combination of the
words “Anglophone” and “fou”, which means crazy in French. We can also the use of the
verb “eliminate” which express an extreme hatred towards Anglophones.
Following the same pattern of analysis, I immersed in Anglophone separatist Facebook
groups to track the hate speech and the disinformation on the side of separatists. During this
immersion, I noticed that 80% of the groups I examined were using a language of hostility
towards the Cameroonian government and towards the francophone in general.
In status posts, and comments I detected a frequent use of words and expression such as “la
republique”, kangaroo Justice (referring to the Cameroonian judicial system), Terrorist
(referring to the President).
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On this post, we can see the use of the expression “La Republique terrorist”. La Republique
is a francophone term that Anglophones in favor of separatism use to name the francophone
part of the country. By combining this word with terrorist, the author of the post clearly
shows hatred towards the Cameroonian government.
Moreover, in most of the groups, I noted that images of the killings, of death bodies were
shared. These images some of the images have been censured or reported inconvenient. The
sharing of this type of content demonstrate a will to mobilize people around hate. Each time
this type of images was shared the authors always claimed that the killers were Cameroonian
soldiers. This type of content can stimulate anger towards the Cameroonian government.
4.2.b Fake News / Disinformation / Manipulation

100% of the Facebook groups I immersed in have an important amount of news headlines in
their newsfeed. The headlines refer to the Cameroonian government, the UN, the killings on
the field, the statements of the Anglophone political leaders. However, this news often come
from unofficial news outlets or personal blogs and from the YouTube and TV channel of
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“Ambazonia”. I noticed that each news seems to be shared and relayed from one group to
another. The most frequently shared news outlets are: Thebopost.com,ambaland.com
I we can also identify videos and Facebook lives coming from the official channel of
Ambazonia. When I watched the videos, and news show coming from that channel I notice
the use of inclusive language and terms such as: we ambazonians, we Southern
Cameroonians, our nation, my people when talking about Anglophones and an exclusive and
hostile language such as: La Republique, Biya killer, Kangaroo justice, zombie government,
when talking about the Cameroonian government.
Moreover, some videos supposedly showing the support of other nations are also shared.
However, these videos do not show any elements that can make us approve their veracity. For
example, some videos showing a German speaking person, are shared and described as
videos of German activists supporting the independence of the Anglophone region. However,
no indicator, no translation for the English or French speaking audience show that the people
talking in the videos are talking about the Anglophone crisis or are making statements in
favor of the independence of the Anglophone region.
The following picture shows a video that is supposed to show young South Africans
supporting the Cameroonian separatist. The videos show young people, speaking English and
pledging allegiance to the republic of Ambazonia in front of a blue background. However,
nothing indicate they are South Africans, or that the video has been made in South Africa.
These people could be Cameroonians, or from another English-speaking country.
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4.2.c Diaspora

During my observation I also tried to identify if there is an involvement of the diaspora in the
online mobilization and narratives. I noticed that a lot of Facebook lives were made by
Cameroonians claiming to be in countries like the US, South Africa, Ghana, France, Uk and
many others.
I also noticed that some of the group members who were sharing content were sharing their
phone number. I looked at the country codes of these phone number were not from
Cameroon.
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This image shows the caption at the bottom of a Facebook live made by a Cameroonian,
apparently supporting the separatist cause. The country code in Cameroon is +237. However,
in this screen capture, we see that the phone number shared has another country code. Most of the
Facebook lives aimed for mobilization had a description with phone number. In some videos, the
speakers clearly state their current geographic location, making statements such as “we the
Cameroonians in the US should stay United if we want the freedom of Ambazonia. Or “It’s been 10
years I am here in Maryland because the Republic has made Cameroon so bad”.

This other image is the caption at the bottom of Facebook live requesting fundraising for the
Anglophone cause. One more time we can see that the country code is not +237, but another
one.
On the different videos and Facebook lives a large amount of speakers tend to be from other
geographic location than Cameroon. The language they use is mostly traducing an opposition
against the Biya government, as well as a call for independence of the Anglophone region.
However, I noticed that the amount of people that watch these videos is different from one to
another. Some are more popular than other. It could mean that some speakers are more
influential than others.
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Moreover, some videos are also talking about the internal dynamics of the Anglophone
movement, which seem to be divided. Indeed, in some videos, the speakers complain about
the lack of unity and structure in the different movements. That could explain the plurality of
armed groups and leaders in the Anglophone separatist struggle.

4.3 Discussion
My study gathered some evidences that could confirm my two main hypotheses about the
sustainability of Anglophone separatist claims in Cameroon which were:
1. The support of the diaspora
2. The use of social media as a bridge between the diaspora and the separatists on the
ground
My interviews gave me some evidences and some directions to validate the first hypothesis.
However, the concept of the diaspora remains hard to capture and define. In the context of the
Anglophone crisis, it is hard to define a precise geographic location from where the support
could come from. In addition, it is hard to capture what criteria a Cameroonian use to define
himself/herself as a member of the diaspora. Some Cameroonians outside the country prefer
not to be defined as member of the diaspora, but only as Cameroonian citizens. Nonetheless,
as mentioned earlier, this hypothesis must be further studied among scholars interested by the
conflict. The contribution of some Cameroonians outside country shows that, in the era of
migrations we are living today, secession goes beyond the borders of a nation-state.
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My study showed that the internet had a role in the conflict, and that this tool is more than a
bridge for communication. I showed that in the context of the Anglophone crisis, it also
helped spread hate speech and disinformation. However, despite these different roles, most of
the operations are happening on the ground. Internet and social media itself do not constitute
the core of operations, even if it helps achieve a mobilization and spread multiple type of
narratives that can influence the conflict.
Finally, during the discussions, I tried to understand how my participant were affected by the
conflict and how they perceive it in their daily life. Surprisingly, the francophone participants
living in the francophone regions in cities such as Yaoundé, Douala explained that they only
feel the crisis because of media, but not on their daily life. However, Anglophone participants
who live either in the francophone or in the Anglophone region affirm feeling the crisis and
being victims of discrimination even before the conflict started. Participants 3 who studied in
Yaoundé mentioned the discrimination he was victim at the university because of his
language. Participant 4, 5 and 6 also claimed to have grown up in a marginalization towards
Anglophone. I concluded that the perception of the conflict could change depending of the
background of my participants. The francophone participants who were born in the
francophone region and who have never been in the Anglophone side declared not really feel
there was a conflict in their daily life. The Anglophone who lived in the Anglophone region
as well as the one who lived in the francophone side affirmed feeling the conflict, even years
before in intensified in 2016.
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4.4Limits

Despite the its methodological rigor, my study has important limits. First, gathering data
about the conflict was not easy, because the question around secession in Cameroon remains
taboo and protected by Cameroonian authorities. I couldn’t engage more participant to my
study because some people I contacted were afraid of a political backlash. In addition, the
time frame I was allowed for this study did not give me the opportunity to look for other
alternatives.
Moreover, being in contact with hate speech and violent content on social media was a
challenge. I had to limit the content I analyzed, to protect myself.
Having explored the dynamics of the Anglophone mobilization, it is important to test its
impact in the public debate. For this purpose, in the next section we will test how some
international media perceived this mobilization, and the conflict in general. We chose to
analyze two mainstream media which are Jeune Afrique and BBC

4.5The mediatic impact of the Anglophone separatist mobilization: a content analysis of
BBC and Jeune Afrique coverage

The Anglophone caught the attention of international mainstream media. Then, I found
interesting to analyze the western media coverage of the conflict. More precisely, this section
focuses on analyzing the media coverage of the former colonial power in Cameroon: France
and Great Britain. The main goal is to test if the British media coverage tend to present the
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Anglophone regions (regions Great Britain used to rule during colonization) as oppressed and
marginalized by the government as the separatists are claiming, and if the French media tend
to be less supportive of this opinion. This section presents a content analysis of the French
media Jeune Afrique and BBC.
methods:
For the purpose of this study, I chose as sample two major French and British media that are
currently covering the Anglophone crisis: Jeune Afrique and BBC. The articles were
collected online, on the websites and Facebook pages of each of those media. we looked at
the coverage between March 2017 and April 2018. Indeed, even if the crisis began in 2016
with corporatist revendications lead by Cameroonian Anglophone teachers and lawyers, we
chose this time frame since the conflict became violent during that period. Moreover, the
separatist movement undertook important protests such as the symbolic declaration of
independence within this time period. The reactions of the Cameroonian government also
intensified during that time frame
I used a sample of 30 online articles, 15 articles for Jeune Afrique and 15 for BBC Africa.
Articles were found and select using keywords such as “Anglophone crisis”, “Anglophone
Cameroon”, “separatists Cameroon”, “Northwestern Cameroon”, “Paul Biya”. To make
the gathering easier, and to have an overview of the chronology and the narratives of the
articles, I classified them on an excel sheet.
After collecting our articles, we did a content analysis of each of them and I pulled out the
language used in these articles when they talk about the Anglophone separatists. For each
media I tried to identify the number of sentences referring to marginalization and oppression
to see if the coverage depicted the Anglophone separatists as marginalized and oppressed as
they claim to be. I also looked at the number of sentences danger and law breaking to see if
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the language of these media depicts them as dangerous or outlaws such as the Cameroonian
government do.
However, despite MY methodological rigor, it is important to mention that the results of our
study cannot be generalized for many reasons. Indeed, there are other British and French
media covering the crisis, such as the guardian, France 24, The Telegraph, Le monde. due to
the time allowed for this study, I didn’t have the possibility to look at all of them.
Findings: Neutrality or dissimulation of biases?
Based on my findings, it would be hard to say that one of the two media promote more the
discourse of marginalization built by the Anglophone movements or the discourse of threat
on national security promoted by the government. Indeed, in both media, the discourse seems
to be balanced.
Jeune Afrique
In Jeune Afrique, the sentences related to marginalization/centralized power were appearing
a little bit more than the one about threat to national security. The articles I choose were long
articles. On the 15 articles, we found 24 sentences explicitly talking about
marginalization/centralized power, while we found about 20 sentences referring to threat to
national security.
I identified as sentences associated with the theme of marginalization/Centralized power as
the one talking about the Cameroonian government and that contained words such as
“discrimination”,

“interdiction”,

“repression”,

“marginalization

“,

“suffering”,

“minority”, centralized, authority, dictatorship.
Despite this result we can’t really affirm that the discourse of Jeune Afrique tend to align
with the discourse of the separatists. Indeed, we noticed that there is an important use of
quotation marks and of the passive voice in the sentences associated to the marginalization of
the Anglophone regions or to the centralization of power of Paul Biya. For example, in this
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sentence of the article of 11/28/2017: “Since the beginning of 2018, many English-speaking
politicians have been denouncing "arbitrary acts (killings, house demolitions)" of the
Cameroonian army in English-speaking areas.” there is a use of quotation marks on
“arbitrary acts”. We suppose that the writer of the article wants to be careful about taking
position or condemning the acts of the Cameroonian army, even if he/she is talking about its
wrongful actions.

marginalization/centralize Threat to national Number of articles
d power
security
24

Jeune Afrique

20

15

Table of the themes in the articles

Moreover, we also looked at the headlines of each articles to see how many of them was
directly fitting into our two themes we choose as variables. We found that, in contrary of the
content of the articles, the headlines tend to refer directly to the threat to national security in
majority, some tend to refer to marginalization/centralized power while some others seem
neutral.

Jeune Afrique

marginalizatio
n/centralized
power

Threat
national
security

neutral

Number
articles

3

8

4

15

Table of the articles’ headlines

This result makes it more difficult to assume that Jeune Afrique is promoting either the threat
to National unity/security, or the one of marginalization/centralized power. Yet as we saw
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previously with content of the article, we also notice a use of quotation marks, especially it
comes to talk about the Anglophone separatists and how the government accuse held them
responsible of some acts. For instance, in the following headline: Anglophone crisis in
Cameroon: a policeman killed by "secessionists", there is a use of quotation on the word
secessionist. It looks like the author is careful about associating the killing of the policeman
with secessionists.
In conclusion, according to the results we gathered, we can’t really say if Jeune Afrique is
supportive of the discourse of separatist about marginalization and the centralized power of
the government. The discourse seems to be balanced regarding each side’s claims.

BBC
As we mentioned in the introduction of this study, the hypothesis we were trying to verify
was if the discourse of the British media was more aligned with the one of the Anglophone
separatists. The articles of BBC were short articles and contained less sentences than the one
Jeune Afrique What we found as result is that the discourse in BBC is way more balanced
than in Jeune Afrique. As we explained in the previous section, we tried to look at the
sentences related to marginalization/centralized power that we associate with the separatist
discourse. On the 15 articles, we were just able to identify 14 sentences that explicitly
referred to this theme while only 12 of them were referring to the threat to national security.
Yet, as in Jeune Afrique there is an important use passive voice when it comes to talk about
the either the actions of the separatists or the one of the governments.

marginalization/cen Threat to national Number of articles
tralized power
security
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BBC

14

12

15

Table of the themes

Moreover, as we did for Jeune Afrique, we looked over the headlines of the articles to see
what which of these two frames was the most dominant. We found only 3 headlines explicitly
referring to marginalization and centralized power: Cameroonian villager: we are living in
fear, Paul Biya Cameroon's "absentee president”, Cameroon hold first cabinet meeting since
2015. The neutral frame seems to be dominant regarding the headlines.

BBC

marginalizatio
n/centralized
power

Threat
national
security

neutral

number
article

3

2

10

15

synthesis
The dominant frame of our analysis in both media seemed to be about the centralized power
of the Cameroonian government Our findings don’t allow us to validate the hypothesis of a
support towards the claims of the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. However, we cannot say
if Jeune Afrique is supportive or not too. This might be because of the limitations of this
study.
Indeed, since we just analyzed the coverage of BBC and Jeune Afrique, we can only validate
the findings our research with this case of study. Moreover, we could argue that maybe our
results could have been different if we collected more articles on the issue, choose other
French and British media sources or looked at a different time frame.
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Nonetheless, we can say that these media play an important role on raising awareness about
the conflict. Most of the articles we have looked at contained reports and statements of NGOs
working to solve the conflict such as International Crisis Group or Amnesty International.
Jeune Afrique and BBC put the spotlight on this conflict.

Section V: Conclusion and Solutions
The Anglophone crisis is happening in an era where social media has been shown to play
roles in other civil uprisings. The diaspora / social media and its relationship in the crisis is
timely to explore. In other words, the Cameroonian case is interesting to the broader
separatist literature because it is an opportunity to better understand whether and how
diaspora use / intervene via social media to support separatist movement, and whether and
how those strategies are effective.
During my study I gathered significant evidences that verified my two hypotheses to explain
the sustainability of the Anglophone separatist movement in Cameroon. I found that
Cameroonian living outside the country tend to participate to an online mobilization on
Facebook through videos, status and comments. Facebook, as well as other online platforms
are more than a simple bridge linking the diaspora and the fighters on the ground. According
to my findings, Facebook and other platforms serve to disseminate hate speech and
disinformation to encourage people to join and fight for the separatist cause. However,
despite this mobilization, the movement seems to be fragmented. The political structure as
well as the leadership remains unclear. Moreover, the different armed groups, and
movements seem not to be linked.
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I also analyzed how this mobilization was perceived by the international media, if the
coverage was showing this mobilization as a danger or legitimate. I found the coverage was
neutral and tended to focus on the reaction of the government.
Beyond the dynamics of the mobilization, my research gave me insights about the how the
conflict involves the Cameroon/Nigeria relationship. Indeed, Nigeria has been part of the
history of the Anglophone Cameroon and had an influence on the geographical configuration
of the Anglophone region. The conflict affects the two counties since there is an important
refugee crisis at the border as well as an intensification of criminality. According to my
findings, some criminal groups operating at the border tend to take advantage of the conflict
and the separatist mobilization to maintain their activity.
Even if my findings were relevant, the role of the diaspora and social media platforms in the
Anglophone separatist mobilization remains to be further explored. Moreover, the diaspora,
and social media are not the only actors to consider in the sustainability of the Anglophone
separatist movement.

5.1 Secession and International Law in Cameroon
In this chapter, I aim to question if the right of secession could be given to the Anglophone
region under international law. I examine the legal frameworks coming both from
international law and the Cameroonian constitution that certainly guarantee the right of selfdetermination to the region but do not consider secession as a primary solution to the issue.
This section aims to respond to the following question: at what point do the Anglophone
region have the right to secede from Cameroon?
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Under international law, secession engages the principle of self-determination. This principle
asserts that it is the right of all peoples to freely choose their social, economic, political and
cultural future without external interference.” And is protected by several charters and laws.
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)8 provide in
their common Article 1 (1) that all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. Similarly, the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV)
adopted in 1970, titled Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (Declaration on Friendly Relations), declares the right of “all peoples” to selfdetermination and places a duty on states to respect this right in accordance with the UN
Charter
The article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right (“ACHPR”) states that
“All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and
shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely
chosen.
1. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds
of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
2. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political,
economic or cultural.”

8

The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights on the OHCHR website:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx
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Despite the apparent institutional instability raised by the crisis, Cameroon has ratified all
these principles and incorporated them in its 1996 constitution. Indeed, the preamble of the
constitution shows à compliance to the principles of the Charters and conventions of the
United Nations, as well as the one of the ACHPR. Moreover, the decentralized form of the
state guaranteed by the article 1 of the constitution as well as the recognition of the e
language as official language9 provide a legal framework for the self-determination of
English-speaking regions.
The existence of these dispositions in the Cameroonian constitution make secession a
debatable option. Indeed, Despite the legitimacy of the Anglophone complaints, secession
appears as an option to avoid. The since the beginning of the conflict, the UN and the
Cameroonian government have not manifested a will to consider this option as a solution.
The establishment of a political dialog between the parties is always encouraged. In addition,
the Anglophone opinion in favor of secession remains a minority. A part of the opinion is for
the implementation of decentralization, another is for federalism. In the next section, I
recommend the strengthening of decentralization an institutional solution.
5.2 A more efficient decentralization
The enforcement and strengthening of decentralization mechanisms seems is the best solution
to create an equilibrium between Anglophone and francophone. Indeed, the current
decentralization in Cameroon, and some constitutional dispositions are not fully implemented
yet. In the current constitution, each region is administered by a governor, who is

9

The Cameroonian constitution states in its the Article 1 (2): The Republic of Cameroon shall be a
decentralized unitary State
In the section 3, it states: the official languages of the, Republic of Cameroon shall be English and French, both
languages having the same status. The State shall guarantee the promotion of bilingualism throughout the
country. It shall endeavor to protect and promote national languages.
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accompanied by an elected regional council. However, this mechanism is not fully applying.
The powers of the governor and the regional council remain limited for political reasons.
If the government works to give more power to each region, it will foster the self
determination of each region including the Anglophone regions.
However, the constitutional council, which has been created in 1996 and which is the
guardian is in charge to verify the constitutionality of such a reform has just been
implemented few years ago. It is the right time for this legal authority to reflect how to better
implement decentralization.
Federalism and secession represent two risky and radical changes regarding the context. On
the one hand the implementation of federalism requires a strong judicial system. Some
experts think that adopting this form of state would lead to a failure like in 1961, because of
the current weakness of the Cameroonian institutions. The improvement of the current
decentralization is a moderate and progressive solution that follows the evolution of the
institutions of the country, and that won’t require a brutal change.
5.3 Intensify Cameroon/Nigeria cooperation
Nigeria and Cameroon must continue intensify their cooperation to manage the conflict.
Indeed, as previously mentioned, the conflict has involved the two countries because of their
history ties, and because of their common border. The two countries, with the help of the UN
and the AU must cooperate economically to handle the ongoing refugee crisis. In the longterm Nigeria and Cameroon must find solutions about how to install more security at their
shared borders. The upcoming presidential election of February in Nigeria could have an
impact on the military and bilateral cooperation of the two countries.
The stability of the region is also important for the economic relation between the two
countries. Nigeria represent an important market of consumption that is beneficial for the
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Cameroonian economy. In addition, a lot of Nigerian investors have developed economic
activities in the Anglophone region, providing employment, and empowering the economic
activity of the region. As we mentioned earlier, the crisis has constrained a lot of Nigerian
investors to flee the region.
5.4 The fight Against Disinformation and Fake News on Digital Platforms
Based on our findings, we can observe that the Anglophone crisis raises the issue of
disinformation, hatred and propaganda on social media in the context of conflicts. Indeed, if
the democratization of the access to internet and social media platforms has fostered the
sharing of true and verified information, it has also given a room to mediatic manipulation,
and to the so called “fake news”. In the context of conflicts such as the Anglophone crisis, as
our data show, this fake news tends to serve as a tool to mobilize and encourage people to
join different armed groups. Some message such as “The UN to send military forces in the
Anglophone Regions” or “Sweden has affirmed its support to the Anglophone struggle” are
some examples that we have identified and verified in separatist Facebook groups during our
study.
At the international level, the issue of disinformation and “fake news” has been addressed in
multiple contexts. On March 3rd, 2017, the United Nations brought together the leading
monitors of freedom of expression around the world to issue a Joint Declaration on freedom
of expression, focusing on fake news, disinformation and propaganda in Geneva 10. During
this gathering, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of opinion and expression
David Kaye declared: “Fake news” has emerged as a global topic of concern and there is a
risk that efforts to counter it could lead to censorship, the suppression of critical thinking and
other approaches contrary to human rights law. In this Joint Declaration, we identify general
10

OHCHR: Freedom of Expression Monitors Issue Joint Declaration on ‘Fake News’, Disinformation and
Propaganda
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principles that should apply to any efforts to deal with these issues.” Some organizations
such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization
of American States (OAS) and the, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (ACHPR).
Besides this important gathering organized by the UN, several initiatives have been observed.
For instance, to fight disinformation coming from Russian media, the European Union has
created a special unit called East StratCom Task Force which has located and verified 1,310
cases of misinformation since the beginning of the year 201811.
In Africa, countries such as Senegal, and Tunisia cooperate with France to address the issue.
The Cameroonian government should follow this new agenda and insert the country in the
conversation around the fight against disinformation. Private initiatives from the civil society
that follow this idea should be encouraged. At the international level, the government should
let the doors open for a conversation with enterprises such as Facebook and twitter to
collaborate.

France24 : “L'Union européenne publie une rétro de la désinformation russe”
https://www.france24.com/fr/20171221-fake-news-retro-russie-ukraine-internet-rapport-europe
11
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